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ABSTRACT Using a discourse-analytic approach, we examine the strategizing that occurred
during an attempted acquisition in 2007/08 of Rio Tinto by BHP Billiton. In doing so, we
contribute to discursive studies of mergers and acquisitions in two significant respects. First, we
show the importance of studying how actors external to, as well as those internal to BHP,
exerted influence over the acquisition process and outcome. Their influence can be attributed,
in part, to their use of rhetorical strategies during the negotiation of the meanings of three
constructs that were central to the acquisition discourse. Second, our study shows how these
rhetorical strategies were put into effect using not only linguistic, but also non-linguistic modes
of discourse such as imagery, indicators, and location. We conclude that obtaining a
comprehensive understanding of the role of discourse in relation to a strategic activity – in this
case an attempted acquisition – requires consideration of the multi-modal rhetorical strategies
brought to bear by both external and internal actors.
Keywords: discourse, external actors, merger and acquisition, multi-modality, rhetoric,
strategy
INTRODUCTION
This article examines the failed acquisition attempt by BHP Billiton (BHP) of Rio Tinto
(Rio) during 2007/08. Had the acquisition gone ahead it would have created the largest
mining company in the world. Instead, BHP abandoned its attempt. The fact that BHP
abandoned its acquisition of Rio makes its attempt to do so no less significant or
interesting as a focus of study. Rather, the attempted acquisition can be seen as a
‘snapshot’ in a continuum of strategic activity which, in recent years, has seen these two
mining giants compete and, in some ventures, collaborate. The strategizing under
scrutiny in this study spanned 12 months, beginning with the announcement by BHP of
its intent to acquire Rio in November 2007, and ending with the announcement in
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November 2008 that it had abandoned the attempt. We use the term ‘acquisition
discourse’ to refer to all actions and interactions between actors that relate to BHP’s
intended acquisition transaction.
Previous studies of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) that have used a discursive lens
have identified how internal actors of the combined organization aimed to influence the
discourse in order to shape the strategy of the organization post M&A (e.g. Halsall, 2008;
Hellgren et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Risberg et al., 2003; Vaara, 2002; Vaara and
Tienari, 2011). Some studies have also sought to examine the important role of rhetoric
in this process (Halsall, 2008; Kuronen et al., 2005; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).
Our study of BHP’s attempted acquisition of Rio contributes to discursive studies of
mergers and acquisitions by showing how key actors external to BHP, as well as actors
internal to the company, influenced the pre-acquisition discourse. We show that external
actors are not simply a passive audience, but instead play an active role in influencing the
structure, meaning, and outcome of discourse during the pre-acquisition stage.
We make a further contribution to discursive M&A studies by showing how both
internal and external actors employed a range of rhetorical strategies in order to influ-
ence the meanings attached to constructs that were central to the pre-acquisition dis-
course. Our study contributes to studies of rhetoric more broadly by showing how
rhetorical strategies are embedded in multi-modal discursive appeals. We show how
appeals to logos, ethos, and pathos were embedded in non-linguistic modes such as
imagery, location, and indicators. We argue that paying attention to both internal and
external actors and their use of multi-modal discursive practices that are embedded in
rhetorical strategies is critical if we are to fully appreciate what occurs during the
pre-acquisition phase of an M&A.
The remainder of this article comprises four main sections. It begins with a review of
the literature that has examined the role of discourse in M&A. In doing so, it makes the
case for exploring how actors both internal and external to firms involved in an M&A
influence the pre-acquisition discourse and why it is important to examine the rhetorical
strategies that they engage in using a multi-modal, discourse analytic approach. The next
section provides background to the case study and outlines the methodology we
employed in order to identify and analyse the multi-modal discursive practices and
connect them with the rhetorical strategies as the acquisition discourse unfolded. Fol-
lowing this, the third section outlines the study results, showing the structure and
evolution of the acquisition discourse and its context over the 12 month period in which
the study took place. The final section draws together the main points of our argument,
and shows how our study contributes to extant theory in ways that allow us to understand
and interrogate M&A discourse more comprehensively; in particular the ways by which
actors shape an acquisition discourse and how they draw on a combination of modes and
rhetorical strategies in order to persuade their audiences and influence the acquisition
outcome.
DISCOURSE IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
A growing body of research has analysed the role of discourse in M&A. A number of
these studies have looked at how these transactions are opposed, justified, or legitimized
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by actors (Brennan et al., 2010; Green et al., 2008; Halsall, 2008; Leonardi and Jackson,
2004; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara and Monin, 2010;
Vaara and Tienari, 2002), or how success is discursively constructed (Hellgren et al.,
2002; Vaara, 2002). Several studies have also drawn on classical (Aristotle, 1991) or New
Rhetoric theory (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 2010) to explore the use of rhetorical
strategies by actors seeking to persuade an audience during mergers, acquisitions, or
major organizational restructures. For example, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) talk
about the need for a rhetor to make strategic use of underlying world-views. Similarly,
Erkama and Vaara (2010, p. 817) state that ‘successful framing requires that the audi-
ence can link the message to other discourses’. Green et al. (2008), in their analysis of the
rhetoric of corporate board members during corporate takeovers and takeover defences,
use Aristotle’s (1991) classification of rhetorical strategies: logos, pathos, and ethos.
Green (2004) defines logos appeals as emphasizing logic and as being associated with
rational and methodical calculations of means and ends. Such appeals also address
audience desires for effective and efficient action. Further, they may confer pragmatic
and cognitive legitimacy by playing to the audience’s self-interests and by providing them
with plausible explanations and arguments based on evidence and fact. Appeals based on
pathos work to construct pragmatic legitimacy by prompting emotional responses. They
excite the imagination and grab the audience’s attention. Ethos appeals connect actions
and institutions to cultural norms and expectations and encourage judgments regarding
‘character’; that is, on the basis of whether someone or something is ‘right’, ‘proper’, or
‘appropriate’. Such appeals build moral legitimacy by bringing attention to supportive
sources that carry authority and that are respected by the audience. Most of these
rhetoric-focused studies suggest that the discourse surrounding M&A draws predomi-
nantly on rational argument (Hellgren et al., 2002; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara and
Tienari, 2002). Where the focus extends to broader appeals beyond the rational it has
been related to cases of cross-border transactions and concerned arguments about
national culture and identity (Halsall, 2008; Hellgren et al., 2002; Mittra, 2006; Riad and
Vaara, 2011; Sarala and Vaara, 2010; Tienari et al., 2003, 2005).
To date, the literature on discourse and M&A has tended to look at what happens
following an M&A transaction. In contrast, our study focuses on the discourse that preceded
an M&A by exploring the discursive practices that occurred in the lead up to the failed
acquisition of Rio by BHP. We argue that this difference is important as the role and
importance of actors in an M&A discourse differ before and after the actual transaction
occurs, and may explain why discourse studies of M&A have tended to examine senior,
internal actors. Where studies have examined the roles of actors external to the acquirer
or acquisition target, these have generally focussed on the media (Hellgren et al., 2002;
Kuronen et al., 2005; Vaara and Tienari, 2002). These observations correspond with
those of Jarzabkowski and her colleagues who, in discussing studies of strategizing more
generally, noted that relatively little research has been published about the role of
external actors in shaping a firm’s strategy ( Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2008; Jarzabkowski
et al., 2007). Our article seeks to overcome this gap in our understanding by bringing
external actors into the research frame and exploring the ways in which they seek to
influence the pre-acquisition discourse. Accordingly, our first research question is: What
role do external actors play in influencing pre-acquisition discourse?
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To date studies of rhetoric in M&A discourse have analysed rhetorical strategies as
embedded in either speech or writing and none have sought to make the link between
rhetorical strategies and non-linguistic discursive modes. In contrast, in exploring an
acquisition discourse we build on several studies outside the M&A domain that have
shown how discourse is not limited to the linguistic, but is multi-modal (Grant et al.,
2004; Iedema, 2007; Jacobs and Heracleous, 2007; Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2001;
Royce and Bowcher, 2006; Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012). These studies demonstrate how
discursive practices are constituted by a wide variety of visual representations, cultural
artefacts, and other modes of meaning making that are used in the realization of social
goals and purposes. Displacing language as the sole or primary focus of study ‘amounts
to a profound reorientation’ (Kress, 2010, p. 79) of our understanding of what discourse
is, and how it is used to express, negotiate, and influence meaning. For example, Roberts
et al. (2006) suggest that even the rhetor’s tone, gestures, or mood are in themselves
modes of discursive practice that can convey meaning. Stigliani and Ravasi (2012) show
how visual artefacts such as sketches and frameworks can be used as discursive resources
to support persuasion and influence. In line with these observations, our study examines
not only speech or writing, but also other modes; in particular, imagery, indicators, and
location. In taking this approach we answer calls by Kress (2010), Iedema (2003, 2007),
and Fairhurst and Grant (2010) to consider the full range of modalities that form
discursive practices. In doing so, our research achieves something that, to date, no other
discursive studies of M&A have achieved; it explicitly analyses the role of non-linguistic
discursive practices employed by a range of actors involved in anM&A. Accordingly, our
second research question is: How do actors internal and external to the acquiring
organization draw on linguistic and non-linguistic modes of discourse in order to bring
to bear rhetorical strategies?
In answering our two research questions we show how external actors use multi-modal
discursive practices and rhetorical strategies to influence not only the acquisition dis-
course but also the acquisition outcomes (Ashcraft et al., 2009; Iedema, 2007). This
relationship between discourse and outcomes has not received a great deal of attention
in the strategy and discourse related literature (Chia and MacKay, 2007; Suddaby and
Greenwood, 2005). In this way our study responds to Chia and MacKay’s (2007) call to
produce more studies that describe and analyse this important link.
CASE STUDY AND METHODS
Our study is exploratory and aims to build theory (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003) in
relation to discourse and M&A strategy. To meet these objectives we have adopted a
qualitative approach involving a detailed investigation of a case study acquisition strat-
egy; namely BHP’s attempt to acquire and merge with Rio. This approach is well suited
to examining and improving our understanding of the complex dynamics surrounding
such an event (Gibbert et al., 2008), including the discursive conduct of a range of actors
involved in the acquisition discourse.
BHP’s attempted acquisition of Rio was initiated on 12 November 2007, when BHP
announced that it had approached Rio with a proposal to acquire it. Both companies had
a dual listing on the London and Sydney stock exchanges with a combined market
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capitalization in excess of US$350 billion. From this initial announcement and through-
out 2008, Rio’s Board continued to reject any valuations of Rio shares provided by BHP
and refused to engage in discussions regarding a merger. Undeterred, BHP made its
submissions to regulators and appealed directly to Rio’s shareholders, who frequently
were also BHP shareholders. Rio’s continued refusal to consider the proposed merger
forced BHP to conduct the acquisition attempt in the public domain and brought in a
range of other actors.
BHP had successfully obtained clearance from US and Australian competition regu-
lators to acquire Rio, and was in the process of securing permission for this from the
European regulator when, on 25 November 2008, it suddenly abandoned its attempt to
do so. BHP purported that the undertakings sought by the European regulator were
unacceptable in the context of a rapid deterioration of near term global economic
conditions, and the associated fall in commodity prices and availability of capital. BHP’s
abandonment of the acquisition marks the end of the period under consideration.
Data Collection
We started by familiarizing ourselves with the background to the case study. This
involved assembling and reviewing a range of information about both BHP and Rio.
Some of this information dated back as far as the formation of both companies, but
was mostly focused on about one year prior to the acquisition announcement. Having
reviewed this information, we then started to collect data spanning the 12 month
period (November 2007 to November 2008) during which the acquisition attempt took
place.
We adopted a multi-modal discourse analytic framework (Iedema, 2007; Kress,
2010; Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2001). This meant we identified the broad range of
discursive practices that were apparent during the acquisition attempt. In doing so, we
sought to examine the patterns of use and relationships among these practices, identify
the different modes, and categorize the rhetorical strategies they brought to bear on
the discourse. Such an approach allowed us to show how, between the announcement
of the intended acquisition and its collapse 12 months later, the leadership of each
organization, shareholders, competition regulators, customers, analysts, and the media
used a variety of modes and rhetorical strategies that influenced the acquisition dis-
course and outcomes.
Our sources of data from the organizations included annual reports, company news-
letters, corporate videos, press releases, and communications to shareholders. The data
also included slides and full transcripts of key presentations to analysts and the media
(including transcripts of ‘question and answer’ sessions following the formal presenta-
tions) throughout the 12 months that were the subject of our study. Other non-
organizational sources include a wide range of journalists’ accounts, stock analysts’
comments, and statements by regulators. In total 4280 pages of material was collected
and analysed. Our approach to analysing these sources of data was consistent with
interpretive methods that have been established by other studies of M&A (see, for
example, Maguire and Phillips, 2008; Vaara et al., 2005).
The Discourse of an Attempted Acquisition 5
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies
Data Analysis
Data analysis comprised five main stages. Instances of disagreement during the coding
that took place over these five stages were resolved through discussion amongst the
coders (Ezzamel andWillmot, 2008; Fendt and Sachs, 2008). At the first stage of analysis,
and in line with the approach taken by Maguire and Hardy (2009) and Maguire and
Phillips (2008), we constructed an ‘event history database’ (Ven and Poole, 1990). This
involved reviewing all our data in order to establish a chronological order of the key
practices of actors throughout the attempted acquisition. Our review did not just include
language used by actors, but also other modes, activities, and the physical context that
contributed to how actors sought to give meaning to the attempted acquisition (e.g. site
visits, analyst briefings, customer meetings, press releases, and share purchases). From
this process we were able to develop an account of how the attempted acquisition played
out (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Langley, 1999).
Second, we identified and coded themes that recurred throughout the data. The main
themes that emerged from this process were explored further and either discarded or
refined (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Those that remained
were then aggregated into three categories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles and
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003). These categories constituted key constructs that were
consistently used by all actors to frame the pre-acquisition discourse in ways that repre-
sented their particular interests and, as the attempts at acquisition proceeded, the
meaning of these constructs was the subject of continued negotiation. We use the term
‘construct’ as it better reflects the negotiation and construction of specific meanings for
particular concepts. The constructs through which meaning was negotiated in this case
concerned the additional value pool, the fair share exchange ratio, and the proposed acquisi-
tion’s impact on competition. The additional value pool refers to the shareholder value that
would result from the creation of a mining giant that could capitalize on the demand
growth of China and India and reduce costs through operational synergies. The fair share
exchange ratio refers to the number of BHP shares that would be paid in exchange for each
Rio share. This needed to be seen as ‘fair’ to gain acceptance from both BHP and Rio
shareholders. The impact on competition is about whether the combined entity would gain
excessive market power, and depended on two key factors: the market share of the
combined organization, and how the proposed acquisition served customer interests by
bringing more product to market faster, as opposed to pushing prices up. For the third
stage of analysis we identified and coded instances where discursive practices were
brought to bear by BHP and its senior leadership on the three key constructs as part of
this negotiation. From this, we identified two primary external actors for the acquisition
discourse who were central to deciding the outcome of the attempted acquisition, in
addition to BHP leadership itself. These were shareholders and competition regulators,
and BHP therefore sought to obtain support for its acquisition strategy from both these
groups. Shareholders included both Rio and BHP shareholders: 60 per cent owned
shares in both organizations. The key constructs of the acquisition discourse pertaining
to shareholders were additional value pool, and fair share exchange ratio. For competition
regulators the key construct of the acquisition discourse was impact on competition. In
addition, there were a number of other actors who could potentially influence the
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decision-makers, including Rio’s leadership, mining analysts, BHP and Rio customers
and suppliers, and journalists. For each of the different actors we identified and coded a
variety of multi-modal discursive practices that were used to contest or support the
interpretation of the key constructs associated with the acquisition discourse. The
purpose of this stage was to develop an appreciation of the breadth of discursive practices
and associated modes that different actors brought to bear on particular constructs.
Our fourth stage of analysis involved our identifying and coding the rhetorical strat-
egies that were connected to actors’ particular practices and associated modes. We coded
these rhetorical strategies as appeals to logos, ethos, and pathos (Aristotle, 1991). Our
decision to do so followed an analysis of some 20 recent articles, which specifically look
at rhetoric or legitimation during M&A or major organizational restructures (e.g.
Brennan et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2012; Cheney et al., 2004; Erkama and Vaara, 2010;
Green et al., 2008; Hellgren et al., 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Vaara and
Monin, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Vaara et al., 2006). Nearly every article used a
different categorization to group rhetorical strategies. However, several acknowledged or
drew on the logos, pathos, ethos categorization (Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Suddaby and
Greenwood, 2005) or used this categorization exclusively (Brown et al., 2012; Green,
2004; Green et al., 2008), making it the most common categorization across relevant
studies. We experimented with alternative and more recently developed ways to catego-
rize rhetorical strategies. Specifically, this included ‘theorizations of change’ from
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), ‘discursive strategies’ (Tienari et al., 2003), and the
‘legitimation strategies’ developed by Erkama and Vaara (2010), Vaara and Monin
(2010), Vaara and Tienari (2008), and Vaara et al. (2006). While we found examples of
rhetorical strategies that could be said to fit each of these categories in our data, they were
only found in linguistic modes (speech and writing) and not in non-linguistic modes. The
classical categories of logos, ethos, and pathos were the only strategies we could consist-
ently connect to non-linguistic modes and we coded accordingly. Indeed, confining our
coding of rhetorical strategies to these categories was both necessary and appropriate
since the aim of our study was to identify the significance of non-linguistic modes of
discourse to rhetoric rather than to specifically test an existing categorization of rhetoric
or to create any new categorizations.
In some cases our coding into logos, ethos, and pathos initially required a disaggre-
gation of a practice into ‘sub’-practices or into separate modes that made up the initially
identified and coded practice. For example, BHP released short videos to seek support
for the acquisition. By disaggregating the modes used in this practice into speech, moving
image, and music we could then identify and code the prevalent rhetorical strategies
embedded in each of the modes (e.g. pathos in music, speech, and moving images; ethos
in moving images, indicators, and speech; logos in speech and moving images).
The final stage of analysis had us moving to a process of axial coding (Maguire and
Phillips, 2008) for each of the three key constructs of the acquisition discourse. Specifi-
cally, it involved a systematic and iterative process in which we moved among our
already chronologically ordered and coded data seeking to identify relationships and
emerging patterns between the actors, key constructs, the multi-modal discursive prac-
tices, and the rhetorical strategies used to support or challenge these. These relationships
and patterns were then refined in ways that created adequate conceptual categories,
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which allowed us to provide an analysis that was grounded both empirically in our data
and theoretically in the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). For example, it allowed us to
identify and show the variety of modes used under each construct, the combinations of
rhetorical strategies used under each mode, and the significance and impact of modes
and rhetorical strategies.
THE NEGOTIATION OF MEANING IN THE ACQUISITION DISCOURSE
The following sections outline our findings, identifying the discursive practices and
rhetorical strategies used by both internal and external actors and how they played an
active role in the evolution of the acquisition discourse and its outcome. Specifically, we
explore how meaning across the three constructs of the pre-acquisition discourse was
negotiated by showing how actors drew on linguistic and non-linguistic modes in order
to bring to bear rhetorical strategies and exert influence. In doing so we illustrate how
meanings in relation to the three constructs that shaped the pre-acquisition discourse
either converged or diverged over the 12 month period. This involves our showing how,
in the case of the additional value pool, external actors accepted from the beginning of the
attempted acquisition the assertions made in regards to the creation of value, and
converged with internal actors. We then show how, in the case of the fair share exchange
ratio, it took some time before the internal actors converged with the external actors, by
increasing the offer for Rio shares. Finally, we outline how internal and external actors
continued to diverge on the acquisition’s likely impact on competition.
External Actors Accept Meaning Proposed by Internal Actors
On 12 November 2007, BHP leadership issued an 18 page statement, which explained
their intent to acquire Rio (Table I). This practice combined the mode of writing and
non-linguistic mode of financial and numeric indicators. Specifically, the statement
included a financial indicator for the additional value pool that would result from bringing
the organizations together, estimated to be US$3.7 billion per annum. Rhetorically, the
document went into great detail to explain the logic of the transaction (logos) and
invoked the authority (ethos) of independent financial advisers, i.e. KPMG and Goldman
Sachs, who wrote that the statement by BHP was made with due care and consideration.
BHP leadership held an initial analyst briefing straight after issuing its written state-
ment. The briefing encapsulated a large number of practices including conducting a
presentation, distributing slides, using teleconference technology, and inviting and
responding to questions. These practices drew on a range of modes, in particular writing,
speech, imagery, location, and financial and numerical indicators. BHP leadership had
titled the presentation ‘BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto: Unlocking Value’. This title cap-
tured the key point of the briefing accurately, i.e. a combination of the two organizations
would create substantial synergies and hence ‘unlock’ an additional value pool for share-
holders. BHP leadership continuously reinforced this construct and the underlying logic
of the acquisition throughout the presentation (logos): 15 of the 31 content slides used in
the briefing referred back to the construct of additional value pool. Figure 1 shows an
example where the proximity of BHP and Rio mining or infrastructure assets was
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visually represented using a map to suggest potential synergies across assets. This visual
representation also drew on ethos: what the map with small circles implied was that the
audience did not have to rely on the authority of BHP (or even KPMG or Goldman
Sachs), but could ‘see’ the potential for synergies with their own eyes.
The presentation by the then CEO of BHP, Marius Kloppers,[1] during the analyst
briefing included a range of other authorities in footnotes as sources for data that
underpinned assumptions like market growth, including the IMF, World Bank, and
OECD. This suggested that BHP’s underlying analysis was trustworthy (ethos) and
supported claims of future demand levels. On occasion, Kloppers did refer verbally to
BHP’s own authority. For example, he mentioned BHP’s success with the integration of
a previous acquisition and claimed authority (ethos) for BHP’s ability to manage large,
complex acquisitions. Further, in his opening remarks for the analyst briefing, BHP’s
Chairman made a point of expressing the highest regard for Rio and its people, describ-
ing it as a ‘fine organization with excellent assets’. BHP CEO Kloppers equally praised
Rio in his presentation. These compliments were more effusive in speech than in writing.
The compliments used the rhetorical strategy of pathos, in that they acknowledged
people associated with Rio, and as a consequence might make them more accepting of
a potentially hostile acquisition. Overall however, the most prevalent rhetorical strategy
Figure 1. Additional value from combining assets
Note: This image has been adapted to enable black and white print.
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for this initial presentation was logos, stemming from the modes of speech, writing,
imagery, and indicators.
Other discursive practices that were brought to bear on the construct of additional value
pool included questions from analysts at the end of the initial analyst briefing. For
example, one unidentified analyst commenced his question by stating: ‘I certainly agree
with you about the uplift to shareholder value for both sets of shareholders. I would
probably describe it as obscene’. The comment illustrated an immediate acceptance by
the analyst of the proclaimed additional value pool, and used pathos. The analyst’s position
of authority (ethos) derived from his connection with a reputable investment bank or
share broking firm (a condition of entry to the briefing).
As mentioned earlier, the meaning of constructs resulted from the discursive practices
brought to bear by all key actors, not just BHP leadership. For example, Rio’s leadership
held an investor seminar, using the same modes as BHP had used in its analyst briefing.
The then CEO of Rio, Tom Albanese,[2] argued that the supposed additional value pool was
value that was already present within Rio, and would be delivered regardless of an
acquisition. This value, according to Albanese, had not been reflected fairly in Rio’s
share price before. As evidence, he presented slides (using speech, writing, imagery, and
indicators) that employed logos and ethos to argue his point.
Like BHP’s briefing, Rio’s seminar also included the practice of analysts asking
questions. At the seminar a UBS mining analyst prefaced his question on synergies,
stating: ‘Just wondering, clearly, if you put BHP and Rio side by side, which you’ve done
and they have, it looks like they understate the cost savings and the benefits of bringing
[BHP and Rio] together’. Albanese responded that, ‘prior experiences of putting
together these types of businesses [showed] that as you get into it more, you can find
more opportunities. And I wouldn’t doubt that that’s the case’. In contrast to the writing
and speech of Albanese’s carefully scripted (formal) presentation, the response showed
that he, like the analyst, agreed that further opportunities for synergies existed.
Location also featured as a mode in the acquisition discourse. For example, after the
initial announcement, BHP CEO Kloppers visited a number of major shareholders.
These people were in a range of different geographic locations, and making the effort to
afford them a face-to-face meeting communicated that they were important to BHP
(pathos), and that their opinion was highly regarded and worth significant effort on
behalf of Kloppers. According to Kloppers, confirmed by statements in the media, these
shareholders agreed that a combined organization could unlock significant additional
value. In an illustrative statement, BT Financial Group’s resources portfolio manager
said, ‘there are clearly synergies involved, not the least of which are two companies trying
to expand as quickly as possible in a market without enough engineers and everything
else’ (Australian Financial Review, 10 November 2007).
Evidenced by the London and Sydney stock exchanges, shareholders expressed their
acceptance of the construct of additional value pool through the trading that occurred.
Additional value was obvious and immediate for Rio shareholders, as they would receive
a premium for their shares if the transaction were to proceed, and pricing shot up after
BHP’s announcement. Just how much BHP shareholders would receive of this additional
value depended on the price paid for Rio shares. Consequently, the second key construct
that shaped the acquisition discourse related to the issue of price.
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Internal Actors Converge with External Actors on Meaning
Whereas other external actors agreed with BHP leaders on the meaning of the additional
value pool, they did not do so regarding fair share exchange ratio. BHP leaders accepted that
if the M&A was to move forward it would have to meet the expectations of these other
actors – particularly shareholders – regarding what they saw as a fair price. Three
months into the period covered by our study, they therefore raised the offer price.
To appreciate those parts of the acquisition discourse that relate to the acquisition
price, it is important to note that BHP proposed an all-scrip transaction. This meant that
no cash was to change hands and only shares were to be exchanged. If BHP leaders could
lift the perceived value of BHP compared to the perceived value of Rio, then BHP would
have to offer less BHP shares for each Rio share. Both BHP and Rio operated in many
of the same commodity markets. If these markets were expected to go up or down, this
would impact on the perceived value of both organizations. The extent to which the
relative value would be impacted depended on the relative exposure of the companies to
the different markets, and their perceived ability to exploit these markets. Therefore, to
create a perception of superiority during the attempted acquisition, BHP leadership
would benefit from giving most presence to the discussion of opportunities where BHP
had an advantage.
A broad range of discursive practices shaped the acquisition discourse where it per-
tained to the exchange ratio of BHP and Rio shares (see Table II). One key discursive
practice that influenced the share exchange ratio offered by BHP was the buying and
selling of shares by shareholders. In the months prior to the acquisition announcement
in November 2007, share prices fluctuated around a relative value of about 2.4 BHP
shares for each Rio share. Using the mode of indicator, BHP’s leadership referred to this
baseline when they announced BHP’s intent to acquire Rio: ‘based on the 30-day figures
prior to when the approach was made, [our proposed ratio of 3.0] values Rio Tinto at
$153 billion; that is a 28 per cent uplift to the volume weighted average closing price’
(Kloppers, Analyst Briefing,12 November 2007). From a rhetorical perspective this
means that Kloppers drew on the authority (ethos) of the share market, which set the
ratio at 2.4, to provide evidence that an offer of 3.0 provided a significant premium to
Rio shareholders.
A further discursive practice pertains to an analyst briefing organized by BHP in
December 2007. Here BHP’s leadership argued its case by pointing out the relative
opportunities of BHP and Rio, and their respective track records in delivering share-
holder value. For example, when discussing the relative value of BHP versus Rio,
Kloppers used speech to communicate sarcastically that ‘the way that Rio Tinto pre-
sented the results counts all of the joint venture tonnage, ignoring ownership. We prefer,
conventionally, to count only the things we own’ (Analyst Briefing, 12 December 2007).
The implication was that Rio had exaggerated its own value and the market should
recognize that in the relative valuation of both companies. In this instance
then, Kloppers was drawing on the apparent logic of only counting what you own (logos),
while using sarcastic speech that undermined the authority (ethos) of Rio’s leadership.
The practices that were brought to bear on the discourse by Rio’s leadership included
a refusal to engage with BHP, and an investor seminar in which they rejected a share
M. Floris et al.12
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exchange ratio of 3.0. This refusal to engage with BHP drew its authority (ethos) and thus
influence from Rio leadership as the major protector of the value of Rio’s shares. In the
seminar, Rio’s leadership argued that its market opportunities and capabilities justified a
more advantageous ratio for Rio shareholders. For example, using the mode of speech
while avoiding a precise indicator, Rio CEO Albanese stated that the offer from BHP
was ‘two ballparks down the road’, suggesting that he felt that the offer was highly
inadequate. This may well have been a deliberate attempt to appear ‘genuinely’ offended
by the offer, but even if this were the case, it reflected the use of pathos (manufactured
or not) by Albanese.
Analysts and journalists had no obvious shared interest in persuading actors one way
or another in the outcome of the acquisition discourse. Questions from analysts at the
briefings of both BHP and Rio indicated that they agreed that a share exchange ratio of
3.0 might not be adequate and would need to be revised upwards. This is confirmed
afterwards by comments from analysts and selected by the media that indicated that a
fair exchange could be around the 3.4 or 3.5 of BHP shares for each Rio share. For
example, according to Stock Resource mining analyst Steve Bartrop:
There is an expectation that [BHP] will have to lift it . . . and 3.5 looks a reasonable
limit, but above that and [they] give away too much to Rio. (Dow Jones Chinese
Financial Wire, 15 January 2008)
For both analysts and journalists the potential influence of comments like these resulted
foremost from the level of authority (ethos) that their audiences assigned to them.
Other discursive practices included letters to shareholders from the respective Chair-
men of BHP and Rio. From a content perspective these letters contained no new
information beyond what was publicly already available. Also, the letters were fairly
short and did not repeat the argument for (in the case of BHP’s letters) or against (Rio’s
letters) in great detail. The purpose of the letters therefore seemed to be, at least in part,
to pay attention to the individual relationship with all shareholders by providing a
personalized communication, rather than only speaking through mass media. Writing
the letters can be seen as attempts by both BHP and Rio leadership to draw on the
rhetorical strategy of pathos and nurture their relationship with shareholders, as only the
largest shareholders could be visited in person.
Also in evidence were discursive practices that used location as a mode, notably site
visits that allowed either journalists or analysts to learn more about company operations,
while offering the company an opportunity to espouse its own views and perspectives to
a captive audience, demonstrate some of its capabilities in situ, and develop relationships.
Overall, what shareholders had been communicating since BHP’s announcement in
November 2007 through share transactions was that the initial offer of 3 BHP shares for
each Rio share was too low. BHP leadership clearly took note of this response. For
example, BHP’s CEO Kloppers interpreted the resulting share price ratio explicitly as a
judgment of the success or failure of discursive practices to persuade investors. He
repeatedly used a graph that plotted the share price ratio over time, a combination of the
modes of imagery and indicators, to explain shifts in the ratio (see Figure 2). As the share
price was, in effect, a proxy for shareholder views, and these actors would, in the end,
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decide on the proposed transaction, it can be seen as embodying an ultimate authority
(ethos) whose signals could not be ignored. Once it became clear that the market was
unlikely to accept the proposed 3.0 BHP shares per Rio share, BHP leadership could
either choose to increase its offer or abandon the acquisition attempt, and in February
2008 Kloppers announced BHP’s formal offer of 3.4 shares for every Rio share.
Following this formal offer, BHP kept up the pressure on the share exchange ratio by
reinforcing its alleged superior exposure to opportunities and capabilities through
various discursive practices. This included a briefing on its oil business in May 2008.
During the briefing BHP tried to reframe how its oil business should be valued. Specifi-
cally, BHP’s CEO Kloppers argued that current reporting practices undervalued the
reserves of his Petroleum business:
In contrast to the Minerals business, where we often use the term ‘resources’ to
describe the potential of a project and where we can formally report resources, under
SEC rules, oil companies can only report proven reserves in its annual results state-
ments. (BHP Petroleum Briefing, May 2008, emphasis added)
Figure 2. Discursive practices and share price development
Note: This image has been adapted to enable black and white print.
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Analysts who covered BHP typically had expertise in mining, but not necessarily in oil.
If Kloppers could make a plausible case as to why a generally accepted logic for the
mining reserves (logos) should also be used for calculating oil reserves, analysts might
have tweaked some of the variables in their spreadsheets, reconstructed the indicator for
BHP’s oil reserves, and increased BHP’s relative value: even a minor shift of 1 per cent
in the perceived value of BHP Petroleum would have added hundreds of millions of
dollars to the market capitalization of BHP.
The formal offer in February 2008 appears to have brought BHP close to, or within
the range of, the share exchange ratio needed to reach support from shareholders. In
contrast to the initial construct, where actors had accepted BHP’s reasoning on what the
acquisition would mean for an additional value pool, now BHP leadership had aligned itself
with the share exchange ratio that shareholders had communicated as fair. The meaning
of what constitutes a fair share exchange ratio appeared quite fixed, and discursive practices
after February 2008 did not appear to shift this significantly. Although there was a slow
drift downwards of the ratio after April, rather than signify change in the perceived fair
share exchange ratio, this drift was interpreted by actors quoted in the media to signify
increasing concern that the regulators may stop the acquisition based on concerns of its
impact on competition.
Internal and External Actors’ Meanings Diverge
The acquisition discourse was also shaped by a range of discursive practices that influ-
enced the construct of the impact on competition (Table III). BHP and the regulators failed
to reach agreement on what the acquisition would mean for competition, leading the
European competition regulator to seek undertakings that were, in the end, unacceptable
to BHP. Our analysis showed significant concerns about competition related to the iron
ore market that were framed by two factors. These factors were, first, the iron ore market
share that the combined organization would have, and second, the assertion that the
combined organization would bring more iron ore to market faster. In this section we will
describe how BHP’s leadership, analysts, media, regulators, and customers brought a
range of discursive practices to bear to define the market share of the merged entity. We
also show how these actors supported or contested the claim that the acquisition would
lead to an increase and acceleration of the iron ore supply, rather than price gauging.
In the written announcement and the initial analyst briefing, BHP was very precise in
its wording and relied on indicators to convey the possible impact on competition that the
acquisition would have. Iron ore was immediately identified as the likely focus of
regulatory concerns. BHP asserted that the combined organization would have a market
share of contestable iron ore sales of approximately 27 per cent, which would decline as
new players entered the market. A footnote stated that this included domestic production
in China, which was also contestable. The implication of this number was that the
market share would be too small for the combined company to have a negative impact on
competition. BHP implicitly asked its audience to accept the asserted market share on
BHP’s own authority as it did not offer external confirming authoritative sources. An
unidentified analyst questioned BHP CEO Kloppers on this, stating during the analyst
presentation that, ‘It seems that if you control almost all the Western Australia iron ore
M. Floris et al.16
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production, you would have the [Chinese] steel industry over a barrel’. This was in effect
a challenge by the analyst about the veracity of BHP’s claims regarding the impact of the
proposed M&A on competition. Coming as it did from an alternative source of authority
(ethos), it immediately threatened Kloppers’ persuasive power.
A range of statements from analysts in the media continued to weaken the 27 per
cent market share asserted by BHP. For example, a Dow Jones Newswires report
quoted an unidentified analyst from an investment bank: ‘They’ve included Chinese
production to dilute their control of the market. It’s very clever of them but I don’t
think it will fool anybody’ (12 November 2007). The report also quoted another
analyst who argued that the relevant market should include only iron ore that was
shipped:
Using the seaborne trade as a benchmark, BHP and Rio together held a 39.5% share
in 2006 . . . Together with the other giant, Brazil’s CVRD . . . the three control about
85% of the seaborne iron ore trade. (Dow Jones Newswires, 12 November 2007)
In this instance, the implied logic (logos) was that the acquisition would reduce this to
only two mining companies who would control nearly all iron ore in the relevant market,
which would have a significant negative impact on competition.
Our analysis identified how actors with different interests brought to bear discursive
practices such that the meaning attached to market share was the subject of ongoing
negotiation. BHP’s leadership preferred a definition that was as broad as possible, as this
would reduce its perceived market share and therefore its perceived ability to exploit that
market. Iron ore buyers, who feared market concentration, needed to have a narrow
definition accepted by regulators as that would increase the chance that these regulators
would either block the acquisition or impose strict conditions on BHP. Mining analysts
had no inherent interest in the outcome of the acquisition and were likely to have the
knowledge and skills necessary to argue what market was ‘relevant’ for competition. This
gave them a significant position of authority (ethos) to influence the definition. By
drawing on this authority of analysts (ethos), the media exerted influence to reject BHP’s
attempt to calculate the relevant iron ore market as inclusive of Chinese domestic
production.
BHP’s second argument to persuade other actors with an interest in the proposed
merger that it should go ahead, was that in combination BHP and Rio could bring ‘more
tonnage to customers more quickly than otherwise would have been possible’ (Kloppers,
12 November 2007). BHP elaborated on this underlying logic (logos) using the modes of
writing, speech, images, and indicators, and Kloppers suggested it was the most impor-
tant advantage of the acquisition.
Customers did not accept this logic, with European and Chinese customers actively
expressing their rejection using a broad range of discursive practices. Statements to the
media were frequent, and one newspaper column concluded that ‘BHP’s argument that
a mega-miner would be beneficial to customers because of increased volume growth is
rather laughable. This deal is about pricing power’ (Lex Column, Financial Times, 12
December 2007). Rhetorically this column combined ethos derived from its reputation,
with pathos by calling BHP’s argument laughable.
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At the time, China did not yet have an active competition regulator that its steel
makers could apply to, but this did not render them without influence. Other practices,
deployed on behalf of Chinese steel makers, included the support of alternative, emerg-
ing iron ore miners, avoiding buying from BHP on iron ore spot markets, and delaying
paperwork required to bring iron ore into China. By far the strongest symbolic action
was the ‘dawn raid’ of 12 per cent of Rio’s London-listed shares lead by Chinese
government-owned company Chinalco. Although this would not necessarily prevent the
acquisition of Rio by BHP altogether, it was generally interpreted as a signal that steel
customers did not accept BHP’s assertion that the acquisition of Rio would benefit
customers.
The most important regulators for approval were the Australian and European com-
petition regulators. Both had been accepting written submissions from actors to deter-
mine the potential impact on competition of the acquisition. Although individual submissions
were confidential, regulators aggregated and published written statements of issues that
summarized the submissions. These statements provided a detailed account of the
reasoning that was likely to underpin its final decision and presented a preliminary view.
The Australian regulator (ACCC) released its written Statement of Issues in August
2008. It did not accept the broader market definition put forward by BHP but empha-
sized the importance of the seaborne iron ore market for pricing in the domestic market,
which reflected the reasoning (logos) of analysts in the media. However, the ACCC had
accepted the reasoning (logos) of BHP that it would not be in its interest to restrict supply.
Nevertheless, BHP’s market power in Australia would enable the company to raise iron
ore prices by more than global iron ore prices. Although Australia only had two major
steel makers, one of whom had its own iron ore mine, the second steel maker, BlueScope,
could suffer from excessive price increases. Consequently the ACCC wanted to investi-
gate some key issues before announcing its decision in October 2008. A few weeks after
the Statement of Issues had been released, BHP closed a new 10-year supply contract
with BlueScope. The contract included new pricing terms that linked price increases to
global iron ore prices and would prevent price gauging by BHP in the domestic market.
In effect, drawing on the mode of writing and the substantial authority of a legally
binding contract (ethos), BHP communicated that it would not be able to unfairly raise
prices for BlueScope. This appeared to resolve the key concern of the regulator and two
weeks later the ACCC cleared the way for BHP to acquire Rio.
The EC Competition Commissioner had issued its written Statement of Issues in July
2008, earlier than the Australian regulator, but its final decision was not due until
January 2009. In contrast to the Australian regulator, the statement mirrored the logic of
European steel-makers that the acquisition could reduce the supply of iron ore and raise
prices. To ease these concerns, the EC Competition Commissioner had been in discus-
sions with BHP in order to secure certain undertakings, including a commitment to
divesting itself of selected iron ore mines, should the acquisition be allowed to proceed.
BHP was required to sign a written contract that would enable the regulator to enforce
the undertakings through the courts (ethos) if required. Ultimately, these undertakings
were, in the context of an emerging global financial crisis, the key reason offered by
BHP for abandoning the acquisition in November 2008, 12 months after the initial
announcement.
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Multi-Modal Rhetoric
The earlier findings identified a range of discursive practices used by both internal and
external actors as they negotiated meanings attached to the additional value pool, fair share
exchange ratio, and impact on competition. As indicated above, we found evidence time and
time again of how actors – both internal and external – appealed to logos, ethos, and
pathos. Here we provide two examples drawn from our detailed analysis of how
these discursive practices brought to bear these rhetorical strategies through different
modes.
The first example is the use of short videos by BHP leadership, early on in the period
under investigation, to promote the merits of the acquisition (see Table IV). In the videos
BHP leaders argued the logic of bringing the organizations together, stating that syner-
gies would create shareholder value (‘cost efficiencies could be enormous’); Rio share-
holders would benefit (from a lift in economic asset value); BHP shareholders would
benefit (from cost synergies and faster revenue growth); and further that it would be
beneficial to customers (who would receive products faster). The logic was also supported
by showing maps that showed the proximity of sites. Throughout the videos it was
suggested that this logic was supported by different sources of authority. As argued when
discussing Figure 1, maps implied that the audience did not have to rely on the authority
of BHP but could ‘see’ the potential for synergies with their own eyes, as the geographic
proximity of assets was a proxy for this potential. Chairman Argus drew on the authority
of the share market when he suggested that past share prices showed that the share
market supported BHP’s ability to successfully integrate large companies. Further, Argus
also used an indicator to draw on the authority of the share market and position the BHP
offer as ‘a 45% premium’ for Rio shareholders, compared to pre-offer share price of Rio.
Other imagery of professional looking staff and modern mining technology further drew
on ethos through their suggestion of strong organizational capability. Lastly, some of the
imagery, as well as the use of music, appeared to aim for evoking an emotional response.
The use of collaborating and handshaking staff, appealing sunsets, underpinned by
upbeat futuristic music, suggested that BHP was dynamic, forward looking, and cared
about its people, and that bringing the organizations together was an exciting strategy to
be part of, for shareholders, employees, and customers.
The second example was the use of a helicopter by Rio to fly journalists over BHP’s
main iron ore port in order to demonstrate that it had a bottleneck and needed Rio’s port
infrastructure to lift exports (see Table V). Rio drew on logic when describing the
bottleneck as caused by, amongst others, ‘a tight S-bend ’, which BHP could only overcome
‘if they had access to our ports’. They also drew on logic by using the imagery and location
above the port to reinforce the idea of a bottleneck, which made ‘apparent [that] Rio has
the better strategic position’. This drew on authority by enabling journalists to see the
bottleneck ‘firsthand’, rather than rely on others. Further, with a neat sense of the
theatrical, the journalists were accompanied by Rio’s Head of Shipping who used to be
a BHP employee and could claim authority due to his inside knowledge of BHP’s
‘problems’. In addition, authority was also derived from the use of indicators, which
provided seemingly objective measures for the capacity constraints. Lastly, a number of
media articles published following the excursion contained some evidence of excitement
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Table IV. Multi-modal rhetoric – create promotional video (BHP leadership)
Modes and examples Rhetoric Convergence/divergence of meaning
Speech:
– ‘. . . [BHP and Rio] ‘. . . have two operations about 2,000 km
from the North Pole [that] . . . so you have . . . these huge diesel
inventories and you have huge processing plants. Everything by
duplicate and . . . 30 minute apart. If you run together what you
could safe in terms of cost efficiencies could be enormous . . .’ (Chief
Commercial Officer Calderon)
– ‘. . . The Rio shareholders lift from around about 36% of the
economic asset value to around about 44 and our own shareholders get
the benefit from not only the synergies but also the upside that occurs
with being able to deliver things quickly . . .’ (Chairman Argus)
– ‘. . . North East Asia needs those products and what we got to be able
do now is to get the supply chain right so that we can get to their
markets quickly . . .’ (Chairman Argus)
Imagery:
– Globe and maps, illustrating close proximity of some Rio
and BHP assets
Logos – Combining the companies
creates value from synergies
– It is good for both sets of
shareholders
– It is good for customers
– Sites are neighbouring
Speech:
– ‘. . . If you looked at what happened to our share price since we
merged with Billiton in 2001, it has just gone through the roof,
and that to me is indicative of what can happen in this sort of a
merger . . .’ (Chairman Argus)
Indicators:
– ‘. . . We’ve offered a 45% premium . . .’ (Chairman Argus)
Imagery:
– includes footage of modern mining operations (heavy
machinery, laboratories), and professional looking staff
(executives and mining site staff )
– globe and maps, illustrating close proximity of some Rio
and BHP assets
Ethos – The share market agrees we
deliver value after a major
merger
– The pre-offer share price
proves our premium
– We are a world class,
professional company
– See for yourself
Speech:
– ‘. . . Both companies are very good companies, and they’ve got very
good people and they’ve got very good Boards . . .’ (Chairman
Argus)
– ‘. . . These are two very good companies, and probably the best two
mining companies . . .’ (Chief Commercial Officer Calderon)
Imagery:
– Includes imagery of people of mixed ethnicity and
gender shaking hands and collaborating, beautiful
weather and sun sets.
Music:
– Upbeat, futuristic music sets a tone of excitement and
underpins imagery
Pathos – Prevent hostility and
perception of BHP arrogance
– This will create a high
energy, great place to be, full
of opportunity
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of journalists about the flight, suggesting that BHP ‘may need to start booking helicop-
ters’ to match Rio’s ‘cheeky media coup’.
Our analysis of the relationship between linguistic and non-linguistic modes and
rhetorical strategies showed how a single mode could bring to bear a broad persuasive
appeal by encompassing all three rhetorical strategies. This was evidenced by the use of
speech and imagery in the first example, and the use of imagery and location in the second
example. Conversely we found that the use of one rhetorical strategy (pathos or logos or
Table V. Multi-modal rhetoric – fly journalists over Port Hedland (Rio leadership)
Modes and examples Rhetoric Convergence/divergence of meaning
Speech:
– BHP’s port expansion plan ‘is going to be very expensive’ and
‘when is it going to happen?’ (Rio iron ore boss Sam Walsh, in
The Australian, in 17/1/2008)
– Rio Tinto’s head of shipping ‘. . . [pointed out] the “tight
S-bend” that the giant iron ore carriers have to negotiate . . .
the narrow channel . . . and the lack of space . . . which
means a ship has to sail before a new one can enter the
port.’ (A. Trounson, The Australian, in 17/1/2008)
– ‘. . .“If they had access to our ports, they could de-bottleneck the
problems they have,” says [Rio CEO] Albanese . . .’ (H.Power,
20/1/2008, The Sunday Telegraph)
Location/imagery:
– ‘. . . in the helicopter . . . it becomes apparent Rio has the better
strategic position . . .’ (H.Power, 20/1/2008, The Sunday
Telegraph)
Logos – BHP needs Rio and
undervalues Rio’s
contribution to additional
value pool. It should increase
the offer
Speech:
– The authority of speech of Rio Tinto’s head of shipping,
Ralph Larby, stems in part from his being a former BHP
employee
Location/imagery: the location above the port allowed key
international journalists to
– ‘. . . get a first-hand look at the limitations of BHP’s port facilities
. . .’ (The Financial Times 17/1/2008), rather than rely on
someone else’s authority.
Indicators:
– Production capacity and maximum expandable shipping
capacity of the BHP’s port (in millions of tonnes) describe
the capacity needs and port constraints
Ethos – We have insider knowledge
of BHP
– Trust your own authority
(i.e. own eyes)
– The bottleneck is a major
problem for BHP
Location: The media appeared excited and impressed by the act:
– ‘. . . Rio Tinto is pulling out all the stops . . . BHP chief executive
Marius Kloppers may need to start booking helicopters if he wants to win
this one . . .’ (The Financial Times 17/1/2008)
– ‘a cheeky media coup’ by Rio (A. Trounson, The Australian, in
17/1/2008)
Pathos – You ( journalists) are
important to us
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ethos) could be reinforcedwhen brought to bear bymultiplemodes. In the examples above
we see how ethos was reinforced in the first example by speech, indicators, and imagery;
and in the second example ethos was reinforced through the use of speech, imagery,
location, and indicators. Both broadening and reinforcing particular rhetorical strategies
through different modes were visible throughout the acquisition discourse. The analysis
shows a rich and multi-layered acquisition discourse in which the meaning of the three
constructs is negotiated by both internal and external actors throughmultiple, overlapping
discursive practices that incorporated mixed modes and rhetorical strategies.
DISCUSSION
The findings outlined above contribute to discourse based theories of M&A by providing
a deeper understanding of the role of external actors in a merger or acquisition discourse.
Although there is some previous research that analysed the role of the media (Hellgren
et al., 2002; Kuronen et al., 2005; Vaara and Tienari, 2002), external actors are largely
under-explored in studies of strategizing (Cartwright et al., 2012; Jarzabkowski and Spee,
2008; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007).Our research identifies that external actors are not simply
a passive audience, but play a significant role in the production and dissemination of
discourses that precede a merger or acquisition transaction. This role is enacted through
a range of multi-modal discursive practices and rhetorical strategies. We argue that in
order to understand howorganizations develop and implement anM&A strategy, wemust
scan the landscape inwhich an organization operates for relevant external actors, and take
note of the modes and rhetorical strategies that they bring to bear on the discourse.
The Role of External Actors in M&A Discourse
Our exploration of the role of external actors led us to identify and distinguish three
overarching roles for external actors in a pre-acquisition discourse. External actors’ roles
are: first, determining the structure of the acquisition discourse; second, persuading
others; and third, deciding whether the transaction will proceed.
Turning to the first of these roles, a micro analysis of how actors negotiate the meaning
of constructs could easily overlook the critical role of decision-makers in determining
what constructs will be negotiated in the first place. Our research suggests that external
actors who are also decision-makers determine the structure of an M&A discourse in two
ways. First, in line with other studies, we argue that for actors to be able to influence or
persuade others, they have to adapt their message (Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Vaara and
Tienari, 2008) and ensure that it aligns with their audiences’ ‘beliefs’ ( Jarzabkowski and
Sillince, 2007) or ‘world-views’, e.g. what broad economic trends may shape global
demand. Second, the key constructs that structure the discourse must reflect the specific
interests of decision-makers. In the case of an individual shareholder this means that the
transaction will increase the value of the shares held. To satisfy shareholders as a group
requires additional value to be created and shared through a price that is neither too high
(which would alienate shareholders of the acquirer), nor too low (which would fail to
persuade shareholders of the target organization). This price can be expressed in differ-
ent ways, e.g. dollars, a share exchange ratio, or a combination of both. In the case of
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competition regulators this means that it will not lead to an unacceptably large market
share that the combined organization could exploit.
Our analysis of the negotiation of meaning related to the attempted acquisition sheds
light on the second role of external actors and extends our understanding of the com-
plexity of this process. Here we show that external actors are not simply an audience to
be persuaded by the arguments put forward by the leadership of an acquirer. Rather, we
have shown the negotiation of meanings in the pre-acquisition discourse is a much more
dynamic process. It involves a multi-directional network of internal and external actors
who swap roles as rhetor and audience on an ongoing basis, as they try to protect their
own interests and persuade each other through discursive exchanges.
The third role we have identified for external actors as part of the production and
dissemination of the pre-acquisition discourse is that of ‘decision maker’. We were able
to identify the crucial role that they can play in influencing outcomes because, unlike
earlier research into M&A discourse, our study focuses on the pre-acquisition
stage when the decision to proceed with the transaction (or not) is still being negoti-
ated. During this stage external actors have considerably more opportunity to influ-
ence convergence or divergence of meanings and ultimately the outcome of the
strategizing.
The different roles of actors are reflected in the model in Figure 3. The model
differentiates between influencers and decision makers, and locates the key constructs
that structure the discourse at its centre. The arrows in the model represent the influence
exerted by key actors as they negotiate the meaning of the key constructs and seek to
influence the acquisition process and outcome.
The model generalizes the external actors and key constructs that shape a pre-
acquisition discourse. For each particular merger or acquisition the strategic landscape
Figure 3. Key actors and their roles in a pre-acquisition discourse
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must be scanned to confirm the external actors and key constructs that will shape the
discourse. Depending on the particular context of the transaction, particular groups of
external actors may choose to play an active role. For example, cross-border transactions
where a foreign entity intends to acquire a domestic company may raise concerns about
foreign ownership, and see other regulators or political lobby groups take an active role
in the acquisition discourse. More generally, when a proposed transaction has the
potential to impact their interests, external actors are likely to seek a greater role in the
discourse. If the institutional context grants these actors the power of decision maker, or
if these actors have significant influence over decision makers, the discourse with external
actors becomes an essential part of organizational strategizing. In the next section we
explore the multi-modal practices and rhetorical strategies used by actors internal and
external to the acquiring organization.
Multi-Modal Rhetoric
Previous studies of M&A and discourse have predominantly focused on analysing speech
and writing (Brennan et al., 2010; Green et al., 2008; Hellgren et al., 2002; Risberg
et al., 2003; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara, 2002; Vaara
and Monin, 2010). Undoubtedly speech and writing remain critical modes to a compre-
hensive analysis of M&A discourse. However, other modes, like indicators, imagery, and
location, are also key modes of M&A discourse (Fairhurst and Grant, 2010; Iedema,
2003, 2007; Kress, 2010). Our study makes a further contribution to studies of M&A by
highlighting the multi-modality of discursive practices that make up an acquisition
discourse. The diversity of discursive practices that emerged from our case reminds us
that, when considering a merger or acquisition process, we must pay greater attention to
modes other than speech and writing.
We found imagery was central to the acquisition discourse and included maps, graphs,
photos, and video. Our research suggests that imagery, including graphs and maps, are
important mediating instruments that help to anchor the key constructs of an M&A
discourse, i.e. they summarize large volumes of data in a single image, which can help
individuals to visually integrate different elements of a strategy and facilitate convergence
around cognitions ( Jørgensen et al., 2012; Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012). For example,
maps can be used to visually suggest either the synergies (through geographical proxim-
ity) or market reach (through geographical dispersion) that a combination of organiza-
tions may deliver, and thus help mediate the negotiation of additional value, which is a
critical construct for any merger or acquisition transaction.
Further, although indicators have not previously been explicitly identified as such, we
argue that in the context of M&A strategizing they are a distinct non-linguistic mode.
Indicators, defined as the output variables of calculative devices, suggest a higher
measure of precision and objectivity than speech or writing (Denis et al., 2006; Skærbæk
and Tryggestad, 2010). As our research showed, actors use indicators to translate their
interests into ‘facts’ (Baxter and Chua, 2003; Miller, 1991), which are more difficult to
contest. This is because actors must have highly specialized technical skills and knowl-
edge to contest an indicator successfully. Also, indicators may come from habits or
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mechanisms (e.g. accounting standards) that have lead to an acceptance of the indicator
at face value, without full appreciation of the underlying logic and limitations of how that
particular indicator was calculated.
Our analysis further showed that the choice of location mattered for meaning making.
In line with arguments by Kress (2010) for differentiating between modes, actors take
account of and adjust the location of their discursive practices to a location preferred by
the community that they try to influence. Also, location does communicate a priority of
social relationships, as actors who are important decision makers and influencers will
receive physical access to a discrete location more readily to other actors. Further, the
choice of location does represent a particular idea about the organization to an actor. In
these ways location functions as a distinct mode in M&A discourse and can influence
meaning making.
Stigliani and Ravasi (2012) show how non-linguistic modes can be used to create
convergence around meanings in collaborative design settings and we extend their work
by showing how these modes can be used in a situation where there is a perceived conflict
of interest and actors aim to persuade or influence each other. We show how visual
artefacts, such as imagery, location, and indicators interact with linguistic modes to
influence and persuade by enacting rhetorical strategies. It is here that our article makes
a contribution to our understanding about the role of discourse and rhetoric in M&A
(Green et al., 2008; Hellgren et al., 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Tienari et al.,
2003; Vaara and Monin, 2010; Vaara and Tienari, 2002). We show how rhetorical
strategies are embedded not just in linguistic modes but in all modes. Further, we show
how a single mode may contain more than one rhetorical appeal, so that a single mode
may appeal to a combination of logos, pathos, or ethos (see Figure 4). As discursive
practices often use a number of modes (both linguistic and non-linguistic) simultaneously,
they work to persuade through a multi-layered, simultaneous, and powerful appeal to
reason, emotion, and authority.
Figure 5 summarizes the second contribution that our article makes to studies of M&A
discourse. It shows how both internal and external actors, through a discursive practice,
can draw on multiple linguistic and non-linguistic modes simultaneously in order to
broaden and reinforce their persuasive appeal and influence the meaning of the key
constructs. As these key constructs represent the interests of the decision makers, the
outcome of the acquisition discourse depends on this negotiated meaning.
A multi-modal perspective is important as a narrow focus on the use of linguistic
modes by actors involved in the production and dissemination of an acquisition discourse
runs the risk of overemphasizing the appeals to logic at the expense of other appeals. As
Figure 4. Examples of the relationship between modes and rhetorical strategies
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it appears that the logic is often explicitly spelled out in speech and writing, this may
explain why most previous research identified an emphasis of rational discourse
(Hellgren et al., 2002; Tienari et al., 2003; Vaara and Tienari, 2002). We argue that
meetings with important customers, shareholders, or journalists contain an appeal to
emotion, through a demonstration of willingness to go through the extra effort of a
one-on-one meeting, even if the linguistic communication during the meeting would only
emphasize rational arguments. Similarly, appeals to authority permeate the discursive
practices of an acquisition discourse. These may be embedded in subtle footnotes to
identify authoritative data sources, in the use of independent consultant or auditors, or
in references to the authority of the share markets when they support the point made by
an actor. Much of this richness, and hence persuasiveness of the appeals, would be
missed if the analysis only considered linguistic modes with their emphasis on logic.
Future Research
While our study offers a number of contributions, we also recognize that it has certain
limitations. First, it uses a single exploratory case study approach. Although this enables
us to provide a rich and detailed account of the attempted acquisition and provides a
good basis for theorizing, any generalizations that we make about strategizing and
discourse and M&A must be made with care. Second, we only used publicly accessible
data such as press reports, speeches, transcripts of analyst briefings, statements by
regulators and so on, and we did not use interview data in our study. While using only
public data was always our intention and enabled us to identify various multi-modal
discursive practices and the context in which strategizing was taking place, it meant that
we did not evaluate key actors’ own perceptions and recollections of what had happened
and use this to complement our existing findings. Further, the analysis here focused on
a particular period and needs to be seen as a snapshot of a longer history of strategizing.
Events following BHP’s attempted acquisition of Rio remained undiscussed, even though
they were direct outcomes of the abandoned acquisition and constituted a next stage in
the negotiation of strategy. Only a longer time horizon would be able to position the
acquisition attempt in the context of long-term strategizing with external actors. Lastly,
while we found that only Aristotle’s classic categories of logos, ethos, and pathos were
evident in both linguistic and non-linguistic modes, it may be that future studies of
different M&As in different contexts, may find evidence of other categories of rhetorical
Figure 5. Model of a discursive practice
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strategies embedded in non-linguistic modes. This future research could extend our
analysis of the persuasive appeal of multi-modal discursive practices.
We believe that a number of important opportunities exist that may extend the
contributions of our study, either by overcoming its limitations or by building on its
strengths. First, future research could be designed to incorporate the use of interview
data. This would provide a more detailed level of insight into the motivations and
reasoning that come into play where key actors discursively engage in strategizing.
Second, our case is of an abandoned acquisition. Moreover, the attempted acquisition
was a hostile and public one. This raises the question of how different kinds of M&A
are discursively played out and, specifically, the effect on this of being in the public
domain. It might therefore be useful to examine some successful or non-public
company mergers and acquisitions using our approach. Third, although the case
touches on this, further research using our approach could explore in more detail how
power is exercised by external actors and used in ways that either support or derail the
strategy or strategist not only during an attempted M&A, but also during other
instances where strategizing occurs, such as board restructures, regulatory reform, or
industry transformation.
CONCLUSION
Our study of BHP’s attempted acquisition of Rio contributes to discursive studies of
M&A (Hellgren et al., 2002; Sillince, 2007; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Tienari
et al., 2003; Vaara and Monin, 2010) by showing how, as an ongoing, iterative, and
recursive process (Grant and Hardy, 2004; Maguire and Hardy, 2009; Robichaud et al.,
2004; Sillince, 2007; Vaara and Monin, 2010), actors both internal and external to BHP
used a range of multi-modal discursive practices in order to deploy rhetorical strategies
that shaped, challenged, and gave meaning to key constructs within the pre-acquisition
discourse. In our view, where studies of rhetoric and M&A omit to examine the multi-
modality of actors’ discursive practices, this is likely to lead to incomplete explanations
and understandings of how actors are able to influence these important strategic events.
The linguistic and non-linguistic discursive practices of key actors with an interest in a
particular strategy have to be taken seriously because they influence the way in which an
organization’s strategy evolves and its eventual outcomes. In the case of BHP, they
ultimately influenced its decision to abandon its attempt to acquire Rio.
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NOTES
[1] Marius Kloppers retired as CEO of BHP Billiton inMay 2013, and was replaced by AndrewMackenzie.
[2] Tom Albanese was replaced as CEO of Rio Tinto by its iron ore Chief Executive SamWalsh in January
2013.
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